Mexico Intelligence Brief January 2011
Over the last month there has been another escalation with regard to supply chain security issues. Unfortunately the ongoing battle on the borders has claimed the lives of two security professionals. These gentlemen have been attempting to create a safe haven system in Mexico. The idea was to identify several key routes leading to the Mexican and U.S. borders. Once these routes were identified the next step was to then create a network of safe havens. The safe haven approach is similar to the secure parking areas used in Europe. It was conceived to protect company drivers (mostly U.S.citizens) should the driver perceive he/she was in any danger. The safe haven was to be stocked with food and additional suppliers to support a driver for several days and allow enough time to enable a response, in the form of a security extraction team, to arrive. It also was to have sufficient space to discreetly hide a semi truck and trailer.
The company the individuals worked for has had several security incidents during this past year. The result was that they lost several priority customer loads. Regretfully the company's security efforts were being thwarted by an insider...an employee that had been co-opted and working for the cartels for nearly a year. This co-opted employee was responsible for route planning and dispatching drivers to pick up loads. Security had asked the “trusted” employee to develop a list of misinformation with regard to route plans to try and confuse the cartels. The misinformation was purposely leaked to individuals that were known to have been working for the cartels. Of course, this approach was not working because the cartels knew all the true details from the co-opted insider. Information that was being disseminated related to high value loads.
Belatedly, after the two security personnel were killed, the company realized there was an inside leak and that is why they had been suffering losses in spite of their countermeasure efforts. They conducted an investigation and identified the insider who had been providing information to the cartels.
During an interview, the employee finally confessed to working for the cartel but claimed that his family was under threat by the cartel. This was sibseqiemtly found to be untrue. In fact, the co-opted employee's family is currently living in New York and works in a Catholic Church, operating a child day-care service for the parish. The family is fine and under no threat according to authorities at the Church. Church authorities explained they had known the family for years and they never displayed any sense of fear or appeared to be threatened in any way. Because this happened in Mexico the employee has not been brought up on any formal charges and the local police have claimed they have no idea what to charge the employee with, even though he is clearly involved in theft and murder. Since the interview with company security, the employee has "disappeared."
Details of how the cartel was able to target the foreign security personnel is not clear but both bodies have been recovered.
Analysis
What lessons can we learn from this unfortunate incident.
First, it is important for security personnel operating in Mexico to understand that if they are threatening or impeding cartel operations, they are potentially subject to being killed. Security personnel operating in Mexico must take precautions and practice all security measures commensurate with the risks.
It is unfortunate that the company did not realize there was an insider earlier. As is often the case, too many of the high value thefts were viewed, incorrectly, as being "bad luck" on the part of the company. It is important to thoroughly investigate each theft and incident. A good investigation could have uncovered the insider and potentially prevented two deaths and multiple high value cargo losses.
In fact, the majority of thefts and incidents in Mexico involve "insiders” who provide details to the cartels to enable them to successfully carry out their operations. As in this case, when caught, the drivers or other insiders who have betrayed the company will claim they were under duress. While duress does occur, in the majority of cases there was no duress. The primary motivation for their actions is, very simply, greed. Company security personnel should know that the "duress" claim is one the cartels recommend and train their personnel to use if caught. They have determined that Western companies are sympathetic and are too often willing to accept this excuse.
Additionally, it was worth noting that the Mexican police are either incapable of, or unwilling to, adequately respond to insider betrayal. If the individual has an opportunity, they will "disappear" so it is important to take immediate action and not plan on subsequent interviews or contacts.
Finally, it was sadly interesting that the "safe haven" concept was one that the cartels felt had enough merit that the individuals responsible for setting it up were killed.
A threat to supply chains in Mexico still remains a major security issue.
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